

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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October 24, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

On Adenauer's Visit

It now seems plain that a visit from Adenauer is the best way of moving forward on Berlin negotiations. He wants it; we believe de Gaulle expects it; the British seem willing, and no other method seems promising.

The preparation for such a meeting is a matter of first importance. I believe you should take charge of it yourself, and not delegate it to the Secretary of State or to the Berlin planning group. I suggest further that you should bring in as personal advisers two men with enormous influence and standing in Germany: Dean Acheson and Robert Bowie. Secretary Rusk's reputation with the Germans is for the moment gravely shadowed by his brief flirtation with "a reduction of confrontation."

If you took this course, Acheson could prepare the brief on our political negotiating position while Bowie concentrated on the larger question of the future of West Berlin and West Germany in a constantly growing Western community. This positive and long-range element in the matter may be crucial in winning the Chancellor's genuine and enthusiastic support. We can probably browbeat him into acceptance of a reasonable negotiating position, but what we want is his leadership, not his surrender.

It is now reasonably clear that Acheson likes the negotiating position that is emerging at the staff level. He is also interested, at least, in the parallel treaties. He would at your invitation take the brief to develop and defend these two alternative bargaining positions.

Flanked by Acheson and Bowie, and of course with Mr. Rusk at your right hand during the meetings, you would be in position to make Adenauer's visit a decisive, positive turning point in the crisis.

McG. B.

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